INTRODUCTION:

The relationship between terrorism and globalization is difficult to describe accurately. Each phenomenon is complicated in its own right and defies simple characterization. It’s inaccurate to suggest that globalization is responsible for terrorism, but technologies associated with globalization is responsible for terrorism, but technologies associated with globalization have been exploited by terrorists. In particular, technologies have improved the ability of terrorist group to work along, disseminate intelligence and exploit uncharted territories. Technology however can’t change the character of the terrorist’s message or the nature of the struggle. Terrorism is a weapon of weak conducted by a minority of individuals who promote an extremist ideology- it often fails to create political change. The global community is not toothless in the face of such violence.

In order to succeed, the global community must utilize the resources at its disposal collaboratively to diminish support for terrorism and demonstrate the illegitimacy of terrorist motives and aspirations.

Historical Background of modern Terrorism:

Historically terrorist have used readily available means to permit small numbers of individuals to straight here as widely as possible in the late 19th and 20th century anarchists relied upon revolvers and dynamite. Yet terrorists and act of terrorism rarely had an impact on national borders. Three factors lead to both of transnational terrorism in 1968: the expansion of commercial air travel; the availability of televised news coverage; and brought political ideological interest among extremist that intersected around a common cause. As a result terrorism grew from local to transnational threat air travel gave terrorists unprecedented mobility. For example the Japanese red Army trained in one country and attacked another such as 1972 Lod Airport massacre in Israel. Air travel appealed to terrorists for other reasons. Airport security measures including passport control were almost non existent when terrorist began hijacking airlines. These skyjackings suited terrace purposes well hijacked airlines offer a degree of mobility and therefore security for the terrace in world States also acquiesced demands, which encouraged for incidents. The success of this tactt spurred other terrorist groups, as well as criminals and political referees, to follow suit. As a result, incidents of hijacking skyrocketed from 5 in 1966 to 94 in 1969. Shared political ideologies stimulated corporation and limited exchanges between groups as diverse as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque separatist Euzhkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). Besides sharing techniques and technical experience, groups demanded that release of imprisoned "fellow revolutionaries" in different countries, giving the impression of a coordinated global terrorist network. It was that groups form relationships of convenience, based on weapons, capabilities, and money to advance local political objectives.

Televised news coverage also played a role in expanding the audience who could witness the theatre of terrorism in their own homes individuals who had never heard of the plight of Palestinians became notionally aware of the issue after incidents such as the live coverage of the hostage taking conducted by Black September during the 1972 Munich Olympics all the media coverage was term the oxygen that sustains terrorism, terrorist discovered that report and audiences lost interest in repeat performances over time in order to sustain your interest and compete for coverage, terrorist groups under to increasingly spectacular tax, such as Caesar of organization of petroleum exporting countries OPEC delegated by Carlos the jackal in Australia in December 1975. Terrorism experts speculated that terrace leaders understood horrific mass casualty attacks might cross a threshold of violence. This may explain why few terrorist groups attempted to acquire use weapons of mass destruction and including nuclear chemical and biological weapons.

The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1917 was a watershed event in transnational terrorism all the Israeli interest remained primary target for the attack due to continuous sympathy for the Palestinian cause a number of groups began to target citizens and other symbols of the USA the decade of terrorism 1980 to 1990 included incidents such as suicide bombings level 1983 and hijackings (TWA flight 847, 1985). During this decade three disturbing trends emerged: fewer attacks that were more deadly and indiscriminate; the increasing sophistication of attacks; and a greater willingness to perform suicide attacks.

Transnational Marxist Leninist groups discovered that their source of support disappeared at the end of the Cold War. In addition, State Law enforcement and paramilitary forces were increasingly effective in combating terrorism. Other terrorist groups discovered that transnational attacks were counterproductive in achieving local aim. For example, ETA and the IRS sought negotiations but still used terrorist attacks as bargaining ploy and to remain visible domestically. Although Marxist-Leninist, transnational terrorism was decreasing in a scale and intensity, militant Islamic terrorism, symbolized by the group Al-Qaeda and enabled by globalization, was growing into a global phenomenon.

Terrorism and the impact of 9/1 1:

A final and fourth factor explaining this phenomenon of personal abuse relates to the longstanding presence in the region of terrorist violence and its seeming upsurge since 9/I I. Quantitative studies show that the best predictor of continuing repression is a history of past repression¹. Thus, much of what we are witnessing since 9/I I should not surprise us. However, there are issues especially associated with any struggle against terrorism that lead to high levels of personal abuse, as well as others that are distinctive in this current phase of counterterrorist activity. The first group of issues is related to the nature of terrorism itself and the problems associated with its definition; the second relates to the political opportunism of a number of governments and their attitudes towards even non-violent political opposition. Finally, there is emulation of the United States and the worst aspects of its anti-terrorist behaviour-a somewhat paradoxical finding, given the prevalence of anti-western and especially anti-US sentiment and rhetoric in the region. An alternative way of understanding this evidence of emulation is to emphasize the instrumental nature of Asian state behaviour: mimicking some forms of current US behaviour connected with counterterrorism is unlikely to attract international or bilateral costs-quite the reverse, in fact.

To return to the first group of issues just identified: the ruthlessness of transnational and domestically based terrorism, reflected in incidents where innocents lose their lives or their limbs, is unsurprisingly a spur to extreme solutions that in some ways are understandable. Claims that the torture of terrorists is justified have been present for centuries in all parts of the world, based on the fact of the terrorists' seeming rejection of the inviolability of innocent human life and their contravention of basic principles of humanity and, in more recent times, international humanitarian law. The terrorists' indifference to a victim's suffering increases the danger that the counterterrorist will respond in kind. After the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, for example, the then Indonesian security minister (now president), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, stated: 'Those who criticize about human rights being breached must understand that all the bombing victims are more important than any human rights issue². This statement is built upon an unwarranted assumption that the protection of human rights has to be traded off against the rights of victims of terrorist acts. Problems in defining terrorism have also played a part in prompting human rights abuse. The UN has struggled for many years to settle on a definition.

Final agreement has fallen victim to debates about what represents legitimate resistance, and where the limits are on the use of violence, especially in cases which some might designate as national liberation struggles. That failure to come to an agreement leaves an opening for abuse, because there is no arbiter in the form of an accepted text. This has resulted in the adoption of wide definitions of what constitutes a terrorist act in the period since September I I: for example, the Indonesian government has described such action as 'any violent act that could create terror or insecurity among the public, violate the public's freedom, cause the death of other people or cause the destruction of vital or strategic objects'. Given the known corruption in Indonesia's judicial system, the breadth of this definition is dangerous. Similarly, in an amendment to the Malaysian penal code in 2003, an act of terrorism is defined as behaviours that 'involve serious bodily injury to a person'; result in 'disruption of certain infrastructure, [or] interference with essential services'; or 'involve prejudice to national security or public safety³. Again, these definitions could also be invoked against demonstrators of many different stripes.

Second, many regional governments have made use of the 'global war on terror' to engage in acts of political opportunism. A 2004 Human Rights Watch report on Malaysia, for example, shows that its Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for an initial detention period of up to 60 days, the subsequent holding in detention for two years, and then renewal of this period without judicial oversight, has led to the arrest of more than I00 individuals on terror- related grounds since August 2001. However, the government has not shown that any of those detained has engaged in illegal activity. In addition, a number of those arrested in this recent wave of detentions under the ISA have been linked to opposition parties in Malaysia, especially PAS-the Parti Islam se- Malaysia, or Islamic Party of Malaysia-which had seen a surge of support in the period immediately after the imprisonment in I999 of Malaysia's former deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim.

China has moved with alacrity to designate its own problems with opposition in Xinjiang, Tibet and elsewhere part of the global anti-terrorist campaign. Indeed, it refers to its crackdowns as campaigns against 'separatism, religious extremism and terrorist forces', linking together what are often distinct groups with distinct agendas, such as Falun Gong and separatist activists in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, tying them all into a Chinese governmental counter- terrorist struggle. On I2 September 2004 Beijing chose to hold an anti-terror exercise in Lhasa, for no security reason. This large-scale exercise involved joint operations among the army, police, paramilitary forces and militia. Chinese security forces have also staged a number of such operations in Xinjiang; one jointly with Pakistani forces.38 Beijing's political design is obvious.

The Chinese government persuaded the Bush administration in August 2002 to agree that the so-called East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) based in Xinjiang was a terrorist movement and had links with Al-Qaeda. This designation of what specialists on this north-western region of China describe as, at best, a relatively amorphous group has had a detrimental impact on the reputation of the whole, largely peaceful, Muslim separatist movement in that area, associating it with terrorist activity in support of a clear Chinese attempt to delegitimize the Uighur struggle for religious and cultural autonomy. The Communist Party head of the province vowed that there would be no let-up in the battle against terrorists who, in September 2004, he claimed-on the basis of no obvious evidence-were gaining ground. Apparently, 'China has included a direct reference to the U.S. decision to include ETIM in the UN list of Al-Qaeda-related terrorist organizations in every single official speech, article and news report on the subject, as well as domestic references to demonstrate that the U.S. was siding with China on this issue.' Not surprisingly, China has avoided all mention of the warnings the United States has issued that the Beijing government also had to address the aspirations of peaceful Uighurs.

Third, there is emulation of America. Some Asian officials have used evidence of US methods in prosecuting the anti-terrorist campaign as licence to adopt similar methods in their own countries. Those approximately I00 individuals held in custody in Malaysia on grounds of involvement in terrorism are reported to have suffered serious abuse and to have been threatened with being sent to Guantanamo Bay's Camp X-Ray if they failed to cooperate-illustrating the latter's status as a symbol that expressed 'a new acceptance of human rights violations in the name of fighting terrorism'. And, in something of a contradiction of the 'Asian values' argument, Malaysia's justice minister has said that his country's ISA is now accepted in the United States and in fact that the US Patriot Act mirrors the provisions in the ISA.43 Indonesia has set up its own version of 'Guantanamo Bay', designating Nazi island as a detention centre for 'processing' Aceh separatists.

Some militaries in Asia engaged in armed struggle have described these campaigns as representing their own 'war on terrorism' against domestic opponents of several different kinds, and in some cases have emulated the 'shock and awe' tactics of the United States and the idea of having 'embedded journalists' with the troops. The Indonesian military's actions in Aceh are a case in point, Aceh separatists being equated with terrorists and human rights groups labeled separatist sympathizers.45 Thailand's so-called 'war on drugs' in 2003, in which2,500 suspected drug dealers were summarily killed, and the Thai military's bloody crackdown on Muslim unrest in the south of the country in April 2004 represent other instances where excessive violence has been adopted perhaps because of a belief that such behaviour mirrors that of the United States and is thereby legitimated.

Emulation of the most powerful has always been important in world politics; thus US behaviour has done untold damage, not only to the rights of those held in US detention centres, but far more broadly to the human rights regime itself, particularly in a part of the world where the hold of this norm was already somewhat tenuous. The many vocal criticisms of US behaviour, among others by its own domestic and international human rights organizations, and notably in the US Supreme Court ruling challenging the Bush administration's claim that those held in Guantanamo are beyond US law, are having some tangible consequences. However, very few governments will give the same attention to the Supreme Court ruling as to the graphic photographs and evidence of abuse that have come out of US detention facilities.

COLLATERAL DAMAGE:

Collateral damage is any death, injury, or other damage inflicted that is an unintended result of military operations. Since the development of precision guided munitions, military forces often claim to have gone to great lengths to minimize collateral damage⁴. Critics of use of the term "collateral damage" see it as a euphemism that dehumanizes non-combatants killed or injured during combat, used to reduce the perceived culpability of military leadership in failing to prevent non-combatant casualties.⁵ Civilian casualties caused by military operations that are intended to terrorize or kill enemy civilians (as, for example, may have been the intent of some strategic bombing during World War II) fall outside the definition of collateral damage⁶.

ETYMOLOGY:

The word "collateral" comes from medieval Latin word collateralis, from col-, "together with" + lateralis (from latus, later-, "side" ) and is otherwise mainly used as a synonym for "parallel" or "additional" in certain expressions (e.g. "collateral veins" meaning veins running parallel to each other, or "collateral security" meaning security additional to the main obligation in a contract).The oldest known usage of the term "collateral damage" in this context occurred in an article written in May 1961 by T. C. Schelling entitled "Dispersal, Deterrence, and Damage".⁷ The term "collateral damage" likely originated as a euphemism during the Vietnam War referring to friendly fire, or the intentional killing of non-combatants and destruction of their property.⁸

Non-military uses of the phrase:

The term has also been borrowed by the computing community to refer to the refusal of service to legitimate users when administrators take blanket preventative measures against some individuals who are abusing systems. For example, Realtime Blackhole Lists used to combat email spam generally block ranges of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses rather than individual IPs associated with spam, which can deny legitimate users within those ranges the ability to send email to some domains. The related term collateral mortality is also becoming prevalent, and probably derives from the term collateral damage. It has been applied to other spheres in addition to the original military context. Fisheries are an example of this, where bycatch of species such as dolphins are called collateral mortality; they are species that die in the pursuit of the legal death of fishing targets, such as tuna.⁹

International humanitarian law:

Military necessity, along with distinction and proportionality, are three important principles of international humanitarian law, governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict and how that relates to collateral damage. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, investigated allegations of war crimes during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and published an open letter containing his findings. A section titled "Allegations concerning War Crimes" elucidates this usage of military necessity, distinction and proportionality: Under international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute, the death of civilians during an armed conflict, no matter how grave and regrettable, does not in itself constitute a war crime. International humanitarian law and the Rome Statute permit belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against military objectives, even when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries will occur. A crime occurs if there is an intentional attack directed against civilians (principle of distinction) (Article 8(2) (b) (i)) or an attack is launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage (principle of proportionality) (¹⁰Article 8(2) (b) (iv). Article 8(2)(b) (iv) criminalizes intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) draws on the principles in Article 51(5)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but restricts the criminal prohibition to cases that are "clearly" excessive. The application of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) requires, inter alia, an assessment of:

· The anticipated civilian damage or injury

· The anticipated military advantage

· Whether (a) was "clearly excessive" in relation to (b).¹¹

CONCLUSION:

Terrorism remains a complex phenomenon in which violence is used to obtain political power to redress grievances that may have become more acute through the process of globalization. Globalization has improved the technical capabilities of terrorists and given them global reach, but hasn’t altered the fundamental fact that terrorism represents extreme radical views of minority faction of the global population. In other words, globalization has changed the scope of terrorism but not its nature. The benefit that globalization provides terrorists is neither one sided nor absolute. The same technologies and processes also enable more effective means to states to counter and combat terrorism. Global terrorists can only success through popular uprising or the psychological or physical collapse of their state-based adversary. Neither outcome is likely given the imitations of terrorist messages and capabilities. Terrorist and counter terrorist campaigns are characterized by prolonged struggle and strife to maintain turmoil and advantages in legitimacy domestically and international recognition. The challenge for the global community will be in utilizing its advantages to win the war of ideas that motivates and sustains those responsible for the current wave of strife struck extremist exigency terrorist turmoil.

REFERENCE:

1. 32 As Poe puts it, 'last year's abuses are an excellent predictor of this year's'. See his 'Does region matter?',

2. p. 65.

3. International Peace Academy conference report, Human rights, the United Nations, and the struggle against

4. terrorism (New York, 7 Nov. 2003), p. I7.

5. Neil Hicks and Michael McClintock, 'Defending human rights in a global "war against terrorism"', Human Rights First, preliminary draft, section on Malaysia

6. Defense.gov News Article: U.S. Military Works to Avoid Civilian Deaths, Collateral Damage".

7. "The Political Psychology of Collateral Damage"

8. Dispersal, Deterrence, And Damage - Tags: Bombers (Airplanes) War". Anthony H. Cordesman (2003). The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons

9. Anthony H. Cordesman (2003). The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons. Praeger/Greenwood.

10. Chuenpagdee, R., Morgan, L.E., Maxwell, S.M., Norse, E.A. and Pauly, D. (2003) Shifting gears: assessing collateral impacts of fishing methods in US waters. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 1, 517-524

11. Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions

12. Luis Moreno-Ocampo OTP letter to senders re Iraq Archived 27 March 2009 at the Wayback Machine 9 February 2006. "Allegations concerning War Crimes"

Received on 04.01.2020 Modified on 05.02.2020

Res. J. Humanities and Social Sciences. 2020; 11(1):62-66.

DOI: 10.5958/2321-5828.2020.00010.8